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Your money or your time? Experimental evidence on overbidding in all-pay 
auctions 
 
  Adriana Breaban1                                   Charles N. Noussair                    Andreea Victoria Popescu 
 
March 7, 2018 
 
Abstract: Competition for a prize frequently takes the form of dedicating time toward winning a contest. 
Those who spend the most time become more likely to obtain the prize. We model this competition as an 
all-pay auction under incomplete information, and report an experiment in which expenditures and rewards 
are in terms of time.  In the experiment, subjects must stay in the laboratory doing nothing for an initially 
prespecified length of time. However, they can bid, in terms of time, to leave early. The auction has an all-
pay structure so that if an individual does not submit the highest bid within her group, she must stay for the 
additional time that she bid. We correlate behavior in this game with behavior in an isomorphic all-pay 
auction played with money bids. We also consider how two measures of sophistication, the Cognitive 
Reflection Test (CRT) score, and performance on a probability calibration task, correlate with behavior. 
We find strong similarities in overall behavior between the auctions conducted with money and with time. 
Bidding greater than equilibrium levels is typical, and as a consequence, average earnings are negative in 
both auctions. Thus, the result that there is overdissipation of rent in all-pay auctions extends to competition 
in terms of time. Higher CRT score and more accurate probability calibration correlate with better decisions 
in auctions played for money but not those played for time.  
 
1. Introduction 
Competition for prizes is a basic feature of many economic and social interactions. Firms compete 
to develop new products, athletes vie to win medals and cash prizes, students compete for grades, 
and applicants fight for jobs. Economists, beginning with Tullock (1980) have modeled these 
competitions as rent seeking games, in which competitors expend resources, with greater 
expenditures translating into a higher probability of winning the prize. An extreme case is winner-
take-all competition, which can be modeled as an all-pay auction. In an all-pay auction, each of a 
number of competing bidders makes a bid. This bid is typically interpreted as an expenditure of 
money, time or effort. The player making the highest bid wins the prize, but losing players pay the 
                                                          
1 Breaban, Economic Science Institute, Chapman University. Noussair: Department of Economics and Economic 
Science Laboratory, University of Arizona. Popescu, Department of Economics, Tilburg University. Correspondence 
to Charles Noussair at cnoussair@email.arizona.edu.  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3138079 
 
2 
 
amount that they bid. In a first-price all-pay auction, the winning bidder also pays an amount equal 
to her own bid.2 Therefore, everyone participating in the game incurs a cost, making the setting 
well-suited to studying competition.  
However, money is not the only medium of reward used in competitions. In this paper, we 
study competition in terms of time. In many settings, the time spent on a task translates into an 
advantage. The popular author Malcolm Gladwell (2008) captures the essence of this correlation 
with his remark that becoming a world-class expert in a domain requires 10000 hours of practice. 
Indeed, in many of the examples cited in the first paragraph, from competition to develop a new 
product, to achievement in work, school, music or athletics, the time one commits to a task is 
critical to achieving a high likelihood of success. This raises an important question: do individuals 
maintain the same strategies across different reward domains when it comes to competing in 
contests? This paper focuses on this question. 
The theory of auctions is general in the sense that the valuations and bids for items may be 
thought of in terms of money, effort or time, and the underlying logic of the models is the same 
regardless of the medium. However, the experimental research that has been conducted to date on 
all-pay auctions has always employed bidding in terms of money, which is the standard medium 
of reward in experimental studies in economics. Thus, bidding behavior in terms of money is the 
only setting that is well-understood. This literature has for the most part documented bidding that 
is more aggressive than equilibrium levels (Davis and Reilly, 1998; Potters et al., 19983; Gneezy 
and Smorodinsky, 2006; Lugovskyy et al., 2010), and overdissipation of the available rent, in 
settings with complete information. Barut et al. (2002), Kaplan et al. (2002), Noussair and Silver 
(2006), and Hyndeman et al. (2012) also observe overbidding relative to equilibrium in 
environments with incomplete information. See Decheneaux et al. (2015) for a review of the 
literature. 
Understanding the allocation of time is also of more general interest, because individuals are 
required to make decisions regarding how to spend one’s time on a continual basis. The total 
amount of time available to an individual is fixed. Consequently, agents have to constantly 
evaluate the benefits and costs of different time allocations. Despite being of tremendous interest, 
                                                          
2 There are a number of other variations, including a second price all-pay auction, in which the winner pays an 
amount equal to the second highest bid, and a dynamic version of the second price all-pay auction, known as the 
war of attrition (Maynard Smith, 1974). 
3 This paper is an exception. Potters et al (1998) find that average bids are close to the Nash equilibrium level. 
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only a limited number of studies in the social sciences have employed time as a source of value. 
This strand of research corroborates the idea that the behavior of players does not change when 
the medium of reward changes. Berger et al. (2012) observe no significant differences between 
ultimatum games where players bargain over money or time. Noussair and Stoop (2015) also find 
that agents do not change their pattern of behavior significantly in either dictator, ultimatum, or 
trust games when playing in terms of money rather than time. No previous experimental studies, 
of which we are aware, have studied the behavior of individuals in an all-pay auction in terms of 
time. 
In the experiment reported here, we study whether participants’ bidding behavior exhibits 
similar patterns when the effort exerted is in terms of time rather than money. To test this 
hypothesis, we create two different protocols. In the first protocol, called MT, subjects participate 
first in fifteen monetary all-pay auctions, and play a one shot all-pay auction in terms of time 
thereafter. Under the second protocol, called T, participants play a one-shot time auction only.    
Our environment is one of incomplete information, specifically the independent private value 
structure introduced by Vickrey (1961). When playing in terms of money, individuals have a 
private monetary value for winning the item, drawn from a distribution that is common knowledge 
and the same for all bidders. Players then engage in a first-price all-pay auction. They submit 
monetary bids simultaneously. The highest bidder receives the item and every bidder pays what 
she bid, regardless of whether or not she won the auction.  
When the auction is played in terms of time, subjects begin with an obligation to stay in a 
private, fully-enclosed cubicle for 30 minutes. During their waiting time, they are not permitted to 
engage in any activity except for sitting quietly. They receive a valuation, denominated in terms 
of minutes, for winning the auction. This valuation entitles them to leave the experiment early, by 
the number of minutes indicated in their valuation, if they win the auction. Each player then 
simultaneously submits a bid in terms of time. A bid consists of a commitment to stay a number 
of minutes equal to their bid, in addition to the initial baseline of 30 minutes. The player who bids 
the highest receives a reduction in his required time in the lab by a number of minutes equal to her 
valuation minus her bid. All other players are required to stay an additional number of minutes 
equal to their bids. 
We first compare bidding with equilibrium behavior, and study overall auction revenue and 
allocative efficiency. We then consider the relationship between cognitive ability and behavior in 
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the auctions. We study whether bidders who display greater ability bid closer to the equilibrium 
levels and achieve greater earnings than other players. The Cognitive Reflection test, proposed by 
Frederick (2005), is employed to measure this relationship. The test has been found to correlate 
strongly with behavior and earnings in second-price auctions (Schneider and Porter, 2016) and 
asset markets (Corgnet et al., 2014; Breaban and Noussair, 2015; Bosch-Rosa et al., 2017). 
Inaccurate beliefs about the relationship between a bid level and the probability that the bid is 
higher than the bids of all other players, might also account for overbidding. While overbidding in 
first-price, winner-pay auctions is consistent with risk aversion (Cox et al., 1982, 1988),  Goeree 
et al. (2002) suggest that overbidding might result from participants’ misperception of the 
probability of winning the auction. Armantier and Treich (2009) present evidence in support of 
the claim that underestimation of probabilities leads to overbidding in first-price, winner-pay 
auctions. Baharad and Nitzan (2008) model how the distortion of probabilistic events, 
encapsulated by prospect theory, can give rise to overbidding in contests. In our experiment, we 
implement a measurement protocol for probability calibration in auctions, and correlate the scores 
of individuals with their earnings and their deviations from equilibrium bidding.  
Our results show that the general patterns in aggregate behavior are similar in auctions for 
money and for time. Regardless of the reward medium, bidding is on average higher than 
equilibrium levels and players lose money on average. The available rent is more than fully 
dissipated for both money and time. However, cognitive reflection test scores and probability 
calibration are positively related to earnings only in the money auction, and not in the time auction. 
A gender effect appears in the time auction in that women bid more aggressively than men. Thus, 
while the general pattern of overbidding relative to equilibrium is robust to the change in reward 
medium, there appear to be some differences between the way bidders approach competition over 
money and over time. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, the symmetric equilibrium bidding strategy of an 
all-pay auction is presented for both the monetary and the time auctions. The experimental design 
is described in section 3. Section 4 presents an analysis of the experimental results for the money 
auction. Section 5 reports the results of the time auctions, and section 6 contrasts the two reward 
media. Section 7 contains some concluding remarks.  
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2. Model 
In this section, we derive a Bayesian equilibrium for the auctions that we study in our experiment. 
This equilibrium serves as the benchmark against which we compare the experimental data. 
Section 2.1 does so for the monetary auction, following closely the arguments of Noussair and 
Silver (2006), and Section 2.2 presents a similar analysis for the time auction.  
2.1. Single unit, first price, all-pay auctions for money 
Consider an all pay auction for one item that is to be sold to the highest bidder among n 
competitors. Each bidder i = {1, …, n} draws a valuation for the item, vi, independently from a 
uniform distribution on [0,?̅?]. Valuations are private information, but the number of players and 
the distribution of valuations is common knowledge. 
The auction follows first price all-pay rules. Each bidder i submits a bid bi ≥ 0 simultaneously. 
The person who submits the highest bid wins the item for sale. All bidders pay their bid, regardless 
of whether or not they obtain the item.  
The utility of player i then takes the following form: 
Πi(bi, 𝑣𝑖) = {
𝑣𝑖 − 𝑏𝑖                                                             if  𝑏𝑖 >  𝑏𝑗   ∀ 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖
−𝑏𝑖                                                      𝑖𝑓 ∃ 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 such that 𝑏𝑖 < 𝑏𝑗
   (1)  
The first term, 𝑣𝑖 − 𝑏𝑖 , is the bidder’s payoff in the event that she wins the auction. This event 
occurs if i submits the highest bid among all players, or in other words, if  𝑏𝑖 >  𝑏𝑗   ∀ 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖. Each 
bidder i receives 𝑣𝑖 in value from the item and pays 𝑏𝑖 to acquire it. The second expression,−𝑏𝑖 , is 
the payoff of bidder i in the event that she is not the highest bidder, in which case she pays her bid. 
This outcome occurs if  ∃ 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 such that 𝑏𝑖 < 𝑏𝑗 . 
Suppose that all bidders are using a symmetric Bayesian equilibrium bidding strategy β(v), 
and further assume that the equilibrium bidding strategy is monotonic so that β’(v) > 0. There is a 
symmetric equilibrium bidding function 𝛽(𝑣𝑖), which in the case of five bidders has the form 
𝛽(𝑣𝑖) =
?̅?(𝑛−1)
𝑛
(
𝑣𝑖
?̅?
)𝑛.                                  (2)  
For the parameters of our experiment, n = 5, and ?̅? = 1000, equation (2) becomes 
𝛽(𝑣𝑖) = 800 ∗ (
𝑣𝑖
1000
)5 .                                           (3)                              
The equilibrium expected payoff for bidder i is: 
𝛱(𝑣i) =(
1
?̅?
)𝑛−1 ∗ 𝑣𝑖
𝑛 ∗  
1
𝑛
 .                                         (4) 
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For our parameters, the expected payoff is:  
𝛱(𝑣i) =(
1
1000
)4 ∗ 𝑣𝑖
5 ∗  
1
5
 = 200 ∗ (
𝑣𝑖
1000
)5 .              (5)  
 A detailed derivation is given in the appendix. The argument parallels that provided by 
Noussair and Silver (2006).  
2.2.All-pay auction with time as a medium of reward and payment  
Now consider an all-pay auction with time as a medium of reward rather than money. Before the 
auction takes place, each bidder has a commitment of time to the auctioneer, equal to K minutes. 
The activity during these K minutes has a marginal disutility, which is assumed to be constant over 
time.4 In the experiment, this consists of waiting for K minutes in the laboratory. The valuation, 
𝑣𝑖 , drawn by each participant, represents the number of minutes that can be subtracted from the 
mandatory K minutes (allowing the participant to leave the experiment earlier) if bidder i wins the 
auction.  
Each bidder simultaneously submits a positive sealed bid 𝑏𝑖, representing the number of 
minutes that she offers to remain in the laboratory, on top of the initial time K. The utility of player 
i is the following:   
 
Ui(bi, 𝑣𝑖) = {
𝑣𝑖 − 𝑏𝑖 −  𝐾                                                  if  𝑏𝑖 >  𝑏𝑗   ∀ 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗
−𝑏𝑖 − 𝐾                                           𝑖𝑓 ∃ 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 such that 𝑏𝑖 < 𝑏𝑗
                 (6) 
Since K is constant, it does not enter the maximization problem. As a result, the equilibrium 
bidding function is analogous to the case where the medium of effort is monetary:            
       𝛽(𝑣𝑖) = ( 
1
?̅?
 )𝑛−1  ∗  
𝑛−1
𝑛
∗ 𝑣𝑖
𝑛       (7) 
For the parameters used in the experiment, where there are 5 bidders, whose valuations are 
drawn from [0, 30], the equilibrium bidding function is: 
   𝛽(𝑣𝑖) = ( 
1
30
 )4  ∗  
4
5
∗ 𝑣𝑖
5                    (8)  
The maximum possible bid consistent with the risk neutral Bayesian equilibrium, is  𝛽(30) = 24. 
  
                                                          
4 This constant marginal disutility can be thought of as risk neutrality in time. It means that an individual is 
indifferent between waiting a fixed amount of time and a random amount of time with the same expected length.  
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3. The experiment  
 
3.1. General description 
The sessions were conducted at the CentER experimental laboratory, at Tilburg University, 
The Netherlands, in 2013 and 2016. Participants were Bachelor’s and Master’s students at the 
University. The experiment had two protocols, called MT and T, and was designed to allow both 
within-and between-subject comparisons of auctions conducted for money and time. In each 
session, only one protocol was in effect. MT consisted of 15 monetary auctions, followed by one 
time auction, while T consisted of one time auction only. Each individual participated in only one 
session.  In both treatments, subjects also completed tasks to measure their cognitive ability and 
probability calibration, before the auctions took place.  
In total, 12 experimental sessions were conducted, six under each protocol. Ten participants 
were present in each session, and thus there were two auctions with five bidders conducted 
simultaneously in each period. On average, each session under the MT protocol lasted 
approximately 2 hours and 20 minutes and subjects earned an average of 21.7 €5. Each session in 
the T protocol lasted approximately 1 hour and 10 minutes and participants earned on average 13.4 
€. Subjects received their earnings by electronic cash transfer made on the evening of the same 
day as the experiment.  
The experiment was conducted using pen and paper, and thus was not computerized. At the 
beginning of the session, the experimenter distributed handouts containing the instructions for the 
experiment. The instructions were read aloud by the experimenter before each part of the 
experiment. Subjects were seated in individual private fully enclosed cubicles that ensured that no 
communication between individuals could occur during the experiment. All questions were 
answered privately. 
 
 
                                                          
5 On average, in the MT treatment, each participant earned 1.95€ in the CRT task, 7.35€ in the probability calibration 
task, -0.89€ during the monetary all-pay auctions, plus a 16€ show-up fee. If losses were incurred during the monetary 
auctions above the initial cash balance of 1000ECU, the loss would be deducted from total earnings made in other 
parts of the experiment. Subjects were informed of this rule at the beginning of the monetary auction. Total earnings 
were sent via bank transfer within 48 hours of the end of the session. Payment via bank transfer is a standard procedure 
at Tilburg University and was how subjects expected to be paid.  
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3.2. The monetary auction 
Fifteen periods of monetary auctions were conducted in the MT protocol. At the beginning of 
period 1, subjects received an initial cash balance of 1000 ECU (Experimental Currency Units). 
The experimental currency was converted to Euros at a rate of 100 ECU per 1 Euro. New 
valuations for the item, denominated in ECU, were drawn each period, from a discrete uniform 
distribution on [1, 1000]. Draws were independent across bidders and from one period to the next. 
Bids were made in terms of ECU and had to be greater than or equal to 0.  
            In each of the 15 periods, bidders submitted bids for a fictitious object available for sale. 
They wrote their bids down on a form provided to them, which was then collected by the 
experimenter. All bids were submitted simultaneously in the sense that no subject could observe 
the choice of any other player before she submitted her bid. The instructions and forms that 
subjects filled out are provided in the Appendix. 
          After collecting the forms and noting the winner, the experimenter returned to inform each 
bidder separately whether she was successful in winning the auction. The bidder with the highest 
bid won the auction and received her valuation minus her bid as a payoff for the period. All other 
subjects incurred a loss equal to the amount of their bid. The participants who did not win the 
auction did not learn the winning bid. In case of a tie, the winner was chosen by a coin flip. There 
was one practice period before the fifteen periods which counted toward subjects’ earnings. 
 
3.3. The time auction 
 
One time auction took place in both the MT and the T sessions. In the time auction, subjects were 
asked to remain in their cubicles for 30 minutes, during which time they were required to be 
passive. They were not allowed to use any electronic device, read, write, or communicate with 
other participants6. They received an additional 6 € for the time auction in addition to any earnings 
from other tasks.  Subjects were given the opportunity to participate in one all-pay auction in 
which, if successful, they could decrease their waiting time in the laboratory from the initial 30 
                                                          
6 This ensured that no other utility was derived during the waiting time, as would have been the case if participants 
could have used their phones or laptops, for instance. 
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minutes and leave the experiment early. Therefore, the currency used within this auction was time 
(in minutes).  
Each participant received a “Time exemption”, the term used to describe her valuation. The 
time exemption indicated the number of minutes that she could leave the session early if she won 
the auction. The time exemption for each individual was drawn independently from a discrete 
uniform distribution7 on [0, 30] which was common knowledge. Players then submitted their bids 
in terms of minutes. The participant who bid the highest had her time exemption subtracted from 
the initial 30 minutes, and the rest then had their bid added to the 30-minute baseline waiting time. 
That is, the winner could leave the laboratory after 30 minutes minus her time exemption plus the 
number of minutes that she bid. All other bidders had to stay for 30 minutes plus the number of 
minutes that they bid. The instructions and examples of the time auction were read aloud. They 
were similar to the monetary all-pay auction, but adjusted to fit the different reward medium and 
valuation distribution. The instructions can be found in the appendix. 
 A practice period was held, in which subjects did not actually have to wait. This was included 
to familiarize subjects with the process. This was followed by a one-shot game, which did count. 
After the participants placed their bids, they were informed of whether they won the auction or 
not, and the total amount of time they were required to wait in their cubicle. When the waiting 
time for an individual expired, the experimenter notified the person that she could leave the 
experiment. Under both treatments, after the auctions were played, a questionnaire regarding 
background information was given to each participant before their waiting period began. 
 
3.4. Probability Calibration 
Under both the MT and T protocols, we elicited a measure of how well subjects were 
calibrated about the probability that a given bid would win the auction. In the MT treatment, 
participants were required to write the probability that a person would win a monetary auction if 
she submitted the following bids: 50, 100, 150, 200, 250, 300, 350, 400, 450, 500, 550, 600, 650, 
700, 750, 800, 850, 900, and 950 ECU. They had to express their answer as a percentage between 
0% and 100%, inclusive. The estimates were incentivized using a quadratic scoring rule (Brier 
                                                          
7  The valuations were drawn from the interval from 0 to 30, in order to ensure that the maximum potential gain, when 
a subject has a valuation of 30 and makes a bid of 0 and wins, would not result in a negative length of time that a 
subject would be required to spend in the laboratory. 
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1950; Nyarko and Schotter,2002; Rey-Biel, 2009) that is incentive compatible8. The payoff 
function was the following: 
  
 Π= max {0, 10- 45*(Pt - Pa )2 }    (7) 
 
where Pt  stands for the indicated probability of winning the auction and Pa represents the actual 
probability. The maximum of the two terms in the expression is taken in order to ensure non-
negative payoffs. The subject could win a maximum amount of 10€ and a minimum of 0€. The 
actual probabilities, to which the guesses were compared, were estimated by a probit regression 
conducted on the data from the first session. Subjects were not informed about their performance 
on this task until the experiment ended. One randomly chosen decision in this task counted toward 
a participant’s earnings.  
3.5. Cognitive Reflection Test 
At the beginning of each session, we also evaluated subjects’ willingness/ability to reflect on 
a decision problem. In both MT and T, we administered the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) 
introduced by Frederick (2005). Each question in the test has an intuitive, though erroneous, 
answer. However, if the respondent reflects on the problem, the solution is straightforward. This 
test is widely used in experimental economics (Branas-Garza et al., 2016).   
Individuals who register to participate in experiments are likely to have taken part in more 
than one experiment, and thus may have been exposed to the CRT previously.  In order to account 
for the possibility, the standard questions were modified while preserving their underlying logic9. 
Specifically, we asked the following three questions: 
 A shirt and a hat cost 5.50 € in total. The shirt costs 5 € more than the hat. How much does 
the hat cost? (correct answer: 25 cents; intuitive erroneous answer: 50 cents)     
                                                          
8  The quadratic scoring rule (QSR) assumes that respondents are risk neutral (Starmer, 2000). Adjustments to QSR 
procedures which account for risk aversion have been proposed by Offerman et al. (2009) and Anderson et al. (2010). 
These methods have been shown to reduce bias, but not to significantly increase accuracy (Trautman and Kuilen, 
2011). 
9 Each individual was asked if they have encountered any of the CRT questions previously. 46% of the participants 
reported that they have seen similar questions before. Nevertheless, 23 % of the subjects who answered 0 or 1 question 
out of three correctly reported that they had already seen the test before. Brañas-Garza et al (2015), in a meta-study, 
find no significant difference in performance on the CRT test between respondents who have seen the test before and 
those who have not.  
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 If it takes 3 people 3 hours to assemble 3 bicycles, how long would it take 90 people to 
assemble 90 bicycles?  (correct answer: 3 hours; intuitive erroneous answer: 90 hours)     
 The forest of North Carolina is home to a colony of wild rabbits. Every year, the colony 
doubles in size. If it takes 24 years for the colony to reach 100.000 rabbits, how long would 
it take for the colony to reach half of that number? (correct answer: 23 years; intuitive 
erroneous answer: 12 years)     
 
3.6 Sequence of activity in each session 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the timing of events in each of the two treatments. The MT protocol 
consisted of 4 parts, and the timing is illustrated in the upper half of Figure 1. In the first part, 
subjects were asked to answer the questionnaire for the CRT test. Participants received 1 € for 
each correct response. In part two, after we carefully explained the design of a monetary all-pay 
auction and provided some examples, the probability calibration measurement protocol was 
implemented. It was emphasized that the predictions would not influence payoffs within the actual 
auctions played (and vice-versa). One prediction, which would be drawn randomly at the end of 
the experiment, would determine the participant’s payoff in part two. In part three, there were 
sixteen periods of monetary auctions: one period of practice that did not count toward participants’ 
earnings, followed by 15 consecutive auctions that did count. A stranger matching procedure was 
implemented, so that each subject was grouped randomly with a new group of four other bidders 
in each period. Finally, one time auction was conducted, and constituted part four of the session in 
the MT protocol. 
The T protocol consisted of three parts. The sequence of events is shown in the lower panel 
of Figure 1. The show-up fee was rescaled to 5 Euros to account for the relatively short length of 
the experiment.  The session began by asking the participants to fill in the questionnaire for the 
CRT test. In part 2, the instructions for the time auction were read. The probability calibration task 
was then administered, with the elicitation of probabilities in terms of time rather than money. 
Participants were required to write down the probability that they believed that a person would 
win the auction if she submitted the following bids: 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, 20, 22, 24, 26 and 
28 ECU. The answer had to be expressed as a percentage between 0% and 100%. Part 3 of the 
session consisted of one all-pay auction in which the medium of reward was time. 
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The next three sections are organized in the following manner. In section four, we consider 
the data from the all-pay auctions played using money as a medium of reward. In subsection 4.1, 
we report the aggregate patterns in the data. In subsection 4.2, we consider individual bidding 
strategies and how they correlate with our measures of sophistication. In subsection 4.3, we 
analyze the correlates of effective bidding. In section 5, we turn our attention to the time auctions. 
As for the monetary auctions, the first subsection, 5.1, reviews the overall patterns in the data. 5.2 
investigates correlations between of bidding behavior and the sophistication measures, and 5.3, the 
determinants of effective bidding. In section 6, we provide a comparison between the monetary 
and time auctions. 
4. Results for the Monetary All-pay Auction 
4.1. Overall bidding behavior and earnings 
Figure 2 shows the average difference between the observed bids and the Bayesian 
equilibrium bid levels, pooled across participants and sessions, for each period separately. In the 
figure, the horizontal axis measures time, the period (1 – 15) in which the auction occurs. The 
vertical axis indicates the average difference between the bids submitted in the period and the Risk 
Neutral Bayesian Equilibrium (RNBE) bid, pooled over all of the MT sessions. Values greater 
than zero indicate that the average bid was greater than the equilibrium level. The figure reveals 
that on average, overbidding occurs in every period. The extent of overbidding does decrease over 
time but remains present, even in the last period.  
 
The MT Protocol  
Part 1: CRT 
Questionnaire 
Part 2: Eliciting Beliefs Part 3: Monetary All-Pay 
Auctions 
Part 4: Time All-Pay 
Auctions 
 
The T Protocol  
Part 1: CRT Questionnaire Part 2: Eliciting Beliefs Part 3: Time All-Pay Auctions 
 
Figure 1. Timing of activity in the two treatments 
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Figure 2. The average difference between the observed bids and RNBE, by period 
 
One consequence of this overbidding is that participants’ earnings are lower than predicted. 
Summary statistics of bidders’ earnings are presented in table 1, where aggregate averages across 
all periods, within each session, as well as the equilibrium outcomes, are recorded. The data show 
that the average participant lost money during the monetary auctions. Only 4 out of 60 participants 
made a profit over the 15 auctions, and only 28 failed to lose their entire initial endowment of 1000 
ECU. The rest had their losses deducted from their earnings accumulated in other tasks and their 
show up fee.  
The table also displays the average allocative efficiency observed in the auctions, as well as 
the percentage of auctions in which an efficient allocation occurs, by session. The average 
efficiency is 82%, and the percentage of auctions which are efficient is 46%. This incidence of 
efficiency is lower than that typically observed in winner-pay first price auctions10.  
 
 
  
                                                          
10See for example Cox et al. (1988) who report an efficiency of approximately 98% in first-price winner-pay sealed 
bid auctions. 
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Table 1. Average earnings and efficiency in the monetary auction 
                                              Session 1 Session 2 Session 3 Session 4 Session 5 Session 6 
All 15 periods       
Av. Observed Earnings 
Av. RBNE Earnings  
Efficiency 
% of Auctions that are 
Efficient 
-100.20 
36.90 
87% 
63% 
-61.84 
28.01 
71% 
30% 
-103.56 
24.28 
85% 
40% 
-47.41 
33.40 
73% 
37% 
-115.16 
41.81 
89% 
60% 
-130.16 
39.76 
86% 
47% 
 
Note: The third row of the table, labeled Efficiency indicates the winner’s valuation, divided by the highest valuation 
any player has in the period, averaged across all 15 periods, for each session. The last row is the percentage of instances 
in which the bidder with the highest valuation is awarded the item. 
 
4.2. Bidding behavior at individual level  
To study the reasons for the lower than equilibrium level of earnings, we analyze the 
relationship between valuations and bids at the individual level. Figure 3 displays all bids placed 
in the last five auction periods. In the figure, the horizontal axis denotes an individual’s valuation 
and the vertical axis is the bid that the individual submits. The bids in each round are shown in a 
different color and the Bayesian equilibrium is depicted by a smooth line. 
Heterogeneous behavior is observed among the participants, but there seem to be a few general 
bidding rules that many subjects use. The incidence of the three most common rules is given in 
Table 2. The first is a rule of bidding zero, regardless of one’s valuation. Strictly speaking, zero 
bidding is a requirement that bi(vi) = 0, for all vi. However, in our classification, we admit any 
strategy bi(vi) ≤ 20 for all vi into the category. We consider a bidder to employ a zero bidding 
strategy is she uses the strategy in each of the last five auction periods. Bidding zero is quite 
common, and it is the strategy employed by 25% of bidders. Zero bidding is less common for high 
valuations than for low ones. Zero bidding represents a strategy that almost always leads to a zero 
payoff.11  
                                                          
11 There is a very small probability of a strictly positive payoff if all bidders bid 0, and the tie is resolved in one’s favor. 
There is no possibility of losing money when one bids zero. 
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Figure 3. The Relationship between bids and valuations, Last 5 periods  
 
The figure also shows that submitting a bid equal to one’s valuation is also common. We call 
this diagonal bidding and it is defined as bi(vi) = vi, though for purpose of classification we consider  
bi(vi) ε [vi – 50,  vi + 50] to fall into the category. 13.3% of players are classified as diagonal 
bidders, meaning that they employ a diagonal strategy in the last five periods. Diagonal bidding is 
a poor strategy that is guaranteed to yield a payoff of either zero, in the event one’s bid is the 
highest in the group, or negative if it is not the highest. The diagonal bidding phenomenon is 
common both for low and high valuations.  
A third type of bidding behavior that is not as easy to observe in Figure 3, but that is common, 
is threshold bidding. A threshold bidder bids zero if her valuation is below a threshold, and then 
bids a relatively high amount close to her valuation, when the valuation exceeds the threshold. In 
other words, a threshold bidder pursues a strategy of bi(vi) = 0, for all vi ≤ v*, and bi(vi) = vi for all 
vi > v*, for some v*. We will say that individual i’s behavior meets the criterion to be considered 
in this category if  there exists some v*, such that bi(vi) ≤ 20 for all vi ≤ v*, and  bi(vi) ε [vi – 50,  vi 
+ 50] for all vi > v*. Threshold bidding has been noted in other studies of contests by Noussair and 
Silver (2006) and Mueller and Schotter (2010). Table 2 shows that a full 33.3% of bidders employ 
this strategy in the last 5 periods. 
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We now consider which factors correlate with the use of each of these three strategies. Table 
2 shows the percentage of bidders classified as types corresponding to the commonly used 
strategies described above. The table shows that females are more likely than males to use a 
diagonal bidding strategy and males are relatively more likely to be threshold bidders. Zero or 
threshold bidders are more likely to have high CRT scores and to be well-calibrated than diagonal 
bidders are. Diagonal bidders also earn less and deviate more from equilibrium than the other two 
types.  
 
Table 2. Bidding strategies, gender, cognitive ability and earnings 
 Zero bidders Diagonal bidders Threshold bidders Other 
Percentage using 
strategy overall 
25% 13.33% 33.33% 28.33% 
Percentage using 
strategy  who are 
male* 
46% 
 
25% 
 
55% 47% 
Percentage using 
strategy who have 
CRT=2,3 
86% 
 
38% 
 
85% 53% 
Percentage using 
strategy who are 
well-calibrated12 
36% 
 
50% 
 
36% 
 
41% 
 
Average CRT 2.46 1.00 2.25 1.47 
Average Earnings 
per round 
-41.91 -152.34 -93.54 -109.70 
Average Abs 
deviation from 
RNBE 
167.49 332.39 157.90 257.02 
*The gender information was not collected for 2 subjects 
 
4.3. Correlates of effective bidding 
We use two different notions of effectiveness of bidding strategies. The first is to say that 
an effective strategy is one that is close to the equilibrium level. The second criterion is to define 
an effective strategy as one that yields high earnings. Table 3 below shows which factors correlate 
with both criteria: with Absolute Deviation of bid from equilibrium, and with earnings. The data 
                                                          
12 We consider subjects to be well-calibrated if their accuracy in the probability calibration task was higher than the 
average accuracy level. In our data 39.6% of the subjects (23 out of 58) are well calibrated. Therefore, the 
distribution of performance in the task was right-skewed. 
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in Table 3 show that better probability calibration is correlated with bidding closer to equilibrium, 
and with higher earnings. Overestimating the probability of winning in our calibration task is 
correlated with overbidding and with lower earnings. This pattern is consistent with those players 
with pessimistic beliefs giving up on trying to win the auction, and as a consequence achieving 
higher earnings. Males in our sample bid less than females, exhibit less miscalibration in our task, 
and earn more on average in the monetary auction. Individuals with higher CRT scores also bid 
lower and earn more.  
 
Table 3. Cross tabulation of correlations of subject characteristics and bidding outcomes in the 
monetary auction 
Correlation 
Absolute 
Bid 
Deviation 
Avg. 
Earnings 
Absolute 
probability 
miscalibration 
Probability 
Miscalibration 
Male 
High 
ability 
(CRT=2|3) 
Absolute  Bid 
Deviation 
1      
Avg. Earnings -0.63*** 1     
Absolute 
Probability 
Miscalibration 
0.31** -0.41* 1    
Probability 
Miscalibration 
0.35*** -0.32** 0.43*** 1   
Male -0.23* 0.37** -0.30** -0.32** 1  
High ability 
(CRT=2|3) 
-0.30** 0.16 -0.28* -0.21* 0.20 1 
Note: Absolute Bid Deviation is calculated as avg ׀b-?̃?׀, where b is the actual bid and ?̃? is the Bayesian equilibrium 
bid. Probability miscalibration is calculated as 𝑎𝑣𝑔 (
𝛾−?̃?
?̃?
), where 𝛾 is the actual probability and  ?̃? is the submitted 
probability. This measure captures whether there is underestimation or overestimation; Absolute probability 
miscalibration is calculated as 𝑎𝑣𝑔 |
𝛾−?̃?
?̃?
| and it captures the magnitude of the miscalibration.  
 
 Since CRT scores correlate negatively with deviations from the Bayesian equilibirum, we 
compare behavior between individuals with low and high CRT scores in more detail. The 
differences in bidding behavior between the two groups is illustrated in Figure 4. In the figure, the 
horizontal axes are individuals’ valuations and the vertical axes indicate the corresponding bids.  
Figure 4a shows the behavior of individuals who scored either 0 or 1 on the CRT test, while Figure 
4b illustrates the data for those who answered at least two of the three questions correctly. It can 
be observed that diagonal bidding is largely confined to those with lower CRT scores.  
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Figure 4a. Bids and valuations, last 5 periods, CRT<2 (low scores), equilibrium also shown 
 
 
Figure 4b. Bids and valuations, last 5 periods, CRT≥2 (high scores), equilibrium also shown 
 
To further analyze whether individual probability calibration and cognitive abilities 
correlate with bids and earnings, when controlling for other variables, we conduct robust OLS 
regressions, using cognitive ability and probability calibration as independent variables and the 
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average absolute deviation from the RNBE or average earnings as the dependent variable13. The 
estimation results are reported in Table 4. They show that individuals’ CRT scores are correlated 
with bidding closer to the equilibrium level and with earnings. They also reveal that those who are 
better calibrated earn more money, even when controlling for CRT. Males earn more than females, 
controlling for calibration and CRT scores.  Miscalibration is associated with bidding farther way 
from equilibrium when CRT is not controlled for. When CRT is controlled for, miscalibration is 
associated with higher bidding. Thus, CRT is correlated with lower bids, while miscalibration is 
correlated with deviations from equilibrium. This results in a positive relationship between CRT 
and earnings, since low CRT people overbid relative to the equilibrium. It also results in lower 
earnings for miscalibrated people, who are more likely to deviate from equilibrium, in particular 
by overbidding.    
 
  
Table 4. Determinants of overbidding, differences from equilibrium, and earnings 
(a) Absolute difference between bid and RBNE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
 
Abs. Average 
Bid-RNBE 
Abs. Average 
Bid-RNBE 
Abs. Average 
Bid-RNBE 
Abs. Average 
Bid-RNBE 
CRT -35.69 -34.02  -39.31 
 (-3.42)*** (-3.17)***  (-3.90)*** 
Abs. probability 
miscalibration 
52.58 
(1.39) 
50.15 
(1.36) 
75.037 
(2.25)** 
 
 
Male  -14.90 -29.13 -22.15 
  (-0.67) (-1.16) (-0.94) 
Constant 259.62 265.59 196.86   298.20 
 (8.09)*** (8.37)*** (8.58)*** (12.62)*** 
 
Observations 58 56 56 58 
R-squared 24% 25% 12% 23% 
Note: The dependent variable is the absolute difference between the observed bid and Bayesian equilibrium 
bid, averaged over the 15 monetary auction periods. Each individual participant is a unit of observation. Abs. 
probability miscalibration represents the absolute difference between the probability of winning with a certain 
bid as indicated by a participant and the actual probability, averaged over all 19 calibration questions. OLS 
regression, t-value based on robust standard errors in parenthesis; */**/*** indicates statistical significance at 
10%, 5% and 1% level, repectively. 
                                                          
13 There are two individuals who believed that there was a 0% chance of winning the auction for every bid between 
50 and 950 ECU. They were excluded from the analysis. 
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(b) Average earnings  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Average 
Earnings 
Average 
Earnings 
Average 
Earnings 
Average 
Earnings 
CRT 19.18 15.50  22.56 
 (2.45)** (1.90)  (2.58)** 
Avg. Abs probability 
miscalibration 
-83.50 
(-2.85)*** 
-73.11 
(-2.69)*** 
-84.45 
(-3.02)*** 
 
Male  39.18 45.68 44.51 
  (  1.88) (2.25)** (2.07)* 
Constant -92.49 -107.42 -76.10 -155.84 
 (-3.94)*** (-4.90)*** (-3.55)*** (-7.34)*** 
Observations 58 56 56 58 
R-squared 21% 27% 26% 19% 
 
 
(c)  Average difference between bid and RNBE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Average Bid-
RNBE 
Average Bid-
RNBE 
Average Bid-RNBE Average Bid-
RNBE 
CRT -33.05 -31.99  -39.31 
 (-3.18)*** (-2.96)***  (-3.90)*** 
Probability miscalibration 53.19 
(2.71)*** 
52.60 
(2.52)** 
74.20 
(4.33)*** 
 
Male  -10.86 -21.06 -22.15 
  (-0.48) (-0.88) (-0.94) 
Constant 268.36 270.94 211.45   298.20 
 (11.14)*** (10.62)*** (13.38)*** (12.62)*** 
Observations 60 58 58 58 
R-squared 29% 29% 18% 23% 
 
Our findings regarding behavior and outcomes in the monetary auctions are summarized 
as result 1. 
 
Result 1: In the auctions where money is the medium of reward, bidding exceeds the risk-
neutral Bayesian equilibrium levels on average. There is overdissipation of the available rent, 
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and average earnings of bidders are negative. Those players who are more sophisticated, as 
measured by both CRT scores and probability calibration, bid lower and receive greater 
earnings.  
 
5. Results for the time all-pay auction  
 
5.1. Time auction statistics and individual behavior 
We start by considering the bidding strategies employed in the time auctions. Figure 5 plots 
the relationship between valuation and bid for the time auction played under both protocols. The 
overall pattern in bidding behavior does not seem to be very dissimilar, though under T it seems 
that overbidding is more widespread for high valuations than under MT. 
  
Figure 5. Bidding behavior in all time auctions in the MT (left panel) and T (right panel) protocols 
 
 
Table 5 provides some comparison statistics for the time auction in both T and MT. The 
table shows that the extent of overbidding, in terms of the average percentage overbid compared 
Bid 
Valuation 
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to the equilibrium level, is comparable under the two protocols. Average bidder earnings are 
negative in the time auctions, as in the monetary auctions. The efficiency percentage of auctions 
is lower in the time than in the monetary auctions, indicating that there is more heterogeneity in 
bidding strategies in the time auctions.  
 
Table 5. Summary Statistics for the time auction in both T and MT 
 Time all-pay auction 
( T treatment ) 
Time all-pay auction 
(MT treatment) 
Mean Mean 
Bid-RNBE (in minutes) 3.26 1.39 
Abs |Bid-RNBE| (in 
minutes) 
6.66 5.32 
AV. (Bid-RNBE) >0 7.83 6.38 
Av. Minutes Waited                 33.17 31.05 
Earnings (in minutes) 
Efficiency 
                -3.17 
79% 
-1.05 
72% 
Note: Bid-RNBE is the difference between the actual bid and the risk neutral Bayesian equilibrium bid.  Abs (Bid-
RNBE) is the absolute difference between the actual bid and the risk neutral Bayesian equilibrium bid Av(Bid-RNBE) 
>0 indicates the average overbid.  
Av. earnings are net of initial waiting time, so that for example, an individual who is required to wait 32 minutes has 
earnings of -2 minutes.  
Efficiency is the valuation (time exemption) of the winning bidder divided by highest valuation among bidders. 
 
Table 6 documents some correlates of bidding behavior and earnings in the time auction. 
The table reveals that those who bid higher receive lower earnings. Unlike in the monetary 
auctions, probability miscalibration is not correlated with bidding behavior or earnings. There is a 
strong gender effect. Women bid on average 5.78 minutes which is significantly more than their 
male counterparts, who bid only 0.78 minutes (p= 0.015, N1=29, N2=31, t-test). This is consistent 
with some of the literature on monetary auctions (Chen et al., 2013) that finds that women bid 
higher than men. However, average earnings remain similar for both genders.  
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Table 6a: Correlations between key variables in the time auction under the T protocol 
Correlation 
Absolute 
Av. Bid 
Av. Bid 
Av. 
Earnings 
Absolute 
probability 
miscalibration 
Probability 
Miscalibration 
Male 
High 
ability 
(CRT=2|3) 
Absolute Av. 
Bid 
1       
Av. Bid 0.53*** 1      
Av. Earnings -0.49*** -0.58*** 1     
Absolute 
probability 
miscalibration 
-0.067 -0.070 -0.10 1    
Probability 
Miscalibration 
0.09 0.15 -0.02 -0.12 1   
Male -0.20 -0.28** 0.12 0.08 -0.23* 1  
High ability 
(CRT=2|3) 
-0.001 0.02 -0.068 -0.11 -0.12 0.10 1 
 
Table 6b: Correlations between key variables in the time auction played under the MT protocol14 
Correlation 
Absolute 
Av. Bid 
Av. Bid 
Av. 
Earnings 
Male 
High 
ability 
(CRT=2|3) 
Absolute Av. 
Bid 
1     
Av. Bid -0.092 1    
Av. Earnings -0.24 -0.23 1   
Male -0.18 -0.40*** 0.16 1  
High ability 
(CRT=2|3) 
-0.34*** -0.25* 0.05 0.14 1 
 
 
5.2. Correlates of Effective Strategies 
We now consider whether some player characteristics are predictive of bidding closer to 
equilibrium or for earning greater payoffs. The results for the T protocol are shown in Table 7. The 
analogous estimates for MT are similar and are given in Appendix C.  The regressions presented 
in the table indicate that CRT score and calibration are not correlates of bids or earnings in the 
time auction. The R-squared values show that the variables considered in the regressions explain 
much less variation than in the money auctions. The only significant variable is the tendency for 
male subjects to bid lower than females. While males bid lower than females, they are no closer to 
the equilibrium level, and they do not achieve greater earnings than females. This gender difference 
                                                          
14 The probability calibration data are not included in table 6b, because in the MT protocol, the calibration was 
conducted for the money auction, and not for the time auction.  
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might reflect different utility functions for time,15 or rather the tendency to the use different bidding 
strategies, and our experimental design does not allow us to distinguish between these two general 
explanations.     
 
Table 7. OLS Results – Time auction (treatment T) 
(a) Absolute deviation from RNBE bid 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Abs. Bid-RNBE Abs. Bid-RNBE Abs. Bid-RNBE Abs. Bid-RNBE 
CRT -0.94 -0.85  -0.66 
 (-1.32) (-1.11)  (-3.90) 
Abs. avg. probability 
calibration 
-2.95 -2.44 -1.34  
 (-0.93) (-0.74) (-0.49)  
Male  -2.70 -2.85 -2.83 
  (-1.33) (-1.43) (-1.45) 
Constant 9.51 10.52 8.70   9.26 
 (4.45)*** (4.63)*** (5.22)*** (5.06)*** 
Observations 60 60 60 60 
           R-squared 2.5% 5.8% 4% 5% 
Note: dependent variable: Absolute difference between the risk neutral Bayesian Nash equilibrium and 
observed bid in the time auction. Each individual participant is the unit of observation. Abs. average probability 
calibration is the absolute difference between the probability of winning with a certain bid indicated by the 
participants in the calibration task and the actual probability, averaged across all 19 probability levels. OLS 
regression, t-value based on robust s.e. in parenthesis; */**/*** stands for statistical significance at 10%, 5% 
and 1% level, respectively 
 
(b) Earnings 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Earnings  Earnings  Earnings  Earnings 
CRT -0.001 -0.07  0.15 
 (-0.00) (-0.09)  (0.21) 
Abs. Average 
probability calibration 
-2.50 -2.86 -2.77  
 (-0.73) (-0.81) (-0.88)  
Male    1.88 1.87 1.73 
  (0.93) (0.97) (0.89) 
Constant -2.12 -2.83 -2.98 -4.31 
 (-0.86) (-1.18) (-1.75)* (-2.48)** 
Observations 60 56 60 60 
Goodness of fit:            
R-squared 
0% 2% 2% 1% 
 
 
                                                          
15 There is some evidence that women are more patient than men. See for example Rubalcava et al. (2009). 
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(c)  Deviation of bid from the RNBE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Bid-RNBE Bid-RNBE Bid-RNBE Bid-RNBE 
CRT -0.002 .058    -.002 
 (  -0.00) (0.06)  (-0.00) 
Avg. probability 
calibration 
4.02 2.40 2.39  
 (1.63) (1.04) (  1.01)  
Male  -4.92 -4.92 -5.32 
  (-2.04)** (-2.07)** (-2.19)** 
Constant 3.73 5.98 6.08  6.01 
 (1.64) (2.27)** (3.06)*** (2.31)** 
Observations 60 60 60 60 
Goodness of fit:            
R-squared 
2% 9% 9% 8% 
 
Our findings regarding outcomes in the time auctions are collected as our result 2.  
 
Result 2: In the time auction, bidding exceeds risk-neutral Bayesian equilibrium levels on 
average. There is overdissipation of the available rent. There is no relationship between 
sophistication and bidding behavior or earnings. Women bid significantly higher than men. 
 
6. Comparison between contests for money and time 
In this section we compare bidding behavior between the auctions for time and money16.  We 
present the data from both the T and MT treatments. They are treated as distinct comparisons, due 
to the potential existence of differences between the two treatments. Comparison between the 
money and the time auctions in MT are conducted within-subject. The money auctions and the 
time auctions in treatment T are compared between-subject.    
In the first monetary auction, individuals bid above the equilibrium on average by 9.41 
units, compared to 7.83 units in the time auction in T and 6.38 units in the time auction in MT. 
Thus, the average extent of overbidding is comparable for money and time. We test whether 
deviations from the equilibrium in the first monetary auction in MT and the time auction in 
treatment T, are significantly different. This comparison is important because individual have a 
                                                          
16 As noted earlier, observations in the monetary auctions were normalized in order to make the two auctions 
comparable, by multiplying the deviations from the Bayesian Equilibrium by 3/100. 
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comparable degree of prior experience in the two situations. We observe no significant difference 
(Prob > |z| = 0.17, N1=60, N2=60, MWU)
17. Overbidding is significantly lower in the time auction 
played in the MT treatment when compared with the first monetary auction in MT (Prob > |z| = 
0.007, N1=60, N2=60, MWU). In order to account for the experience accumulated during the 
monetary auctions, we also compare the overbidding behavior between the last monetary auction18 
and the time auction played immediately thereafter. There is no significant difference in average 
deviation from equilibrium between the two auctions (Prob > |z| = 0.3529, N1=60, N2=60, MWU). 
This confirms that bidding moves closer to equilibrium levels with experience. 
However, efficiency, at 75%, is on average 14 percentage points lower in the time auctions 
than in the monetary auction. This indicates that there is greater heterogeneity in the bidding 
strategies employed in the time than in the monetary auction. While money is valued more or less 
similarly among disparate individuals, time appears to be treated differently by different people.  
In terms of earnings, individuals lose on average 2.79 units less (43% less) in the time 
auctions compared to the first monetary auction. This may be because of the greater incidence of 
diagonal bidding in the money than in the time auction. Table 8 shows the prevalence of the types 
of bidding behavior introduced in section 4, in the different auctions. Zero bidding is more 
common in the time auction played in the MT treatment, in which bidders have more overall 
experience coming from the monetary auctions played, by the time they play the time action. 
Diagonal bidding19 is observed in 18% of possible instances in time all-pay auctions, considerably 
less frequently than in the monetary auction. 
There is some correlation between the strategy a given individual uses in a monetary 
auction and in the subsequent time auction in MT. A significant correlation between the use of a 
diagonal bidding strategy in the last five periods of the money auction and in the following time 
auction exists (ρ = .45, p < .001), though there is no similar correlation for zero bidding (ρ = .07, 
p > .1). Earnings are positively correlated in the two types of auction (ρ = .26, p =.04). 
 
                                                          
17 Using a one-tailed t-test we find significant results at 10% level (all of the other significance tests in this paper are 
two tailed)  suggesting that subjects tend to overbid in the monetary auction ( Pr(T > t) = 0.0971, N1=60, N2=60, t-
test).  
18 In order to make the time auction comparable to the monetary, the last monetary auctions are normalized in a 
similar manner as the first monetary auction, by scaling down the values and bids by a factor of 3/100.  
19 Within the context of the time auction, diagonal bidders are individuals who bid +/-5% of their time exemptions 
and zero bidders are individuals who bid 0 minutes. In the context of the first monetary all-pay auction, the same 
conditions apply as the ones described in section 4.2. 
 27 
 
 
Table 8. Bidding strategies in the first monetary auction and the time auction  
 Monetary all-pay auction 
( 1st auction, MT treatment ) 
Time all-pay auction 
( T treatment ) 
Time all-pay auction 
(MT treatment) 
 Percentage Percentage Percentage 
Zero bidders 19/60 (31%) 15/60 (25%) 24/59 (41%) 
Diagonal bidders 25/60 (41%) 10/60 (17%) 11/59 (19%) 
 
 
Figure 6 plots the relationship between the valuation and bid for the time auctions and the 
first monetary auction in MT. The impression one gains from the figure is that using time as a 
medium of reward creates more diversity in terms of bidding behavior compared to money.  
 
  
Figure 6. Bidding behavior in all time auctions (panel 1) and in the monetary auction (panel 2) 
 
Figure 7 illustrates the relationship between bidding behavior and CRT score. The panel 
on the left contains the data from the first monetary auction while that on the right corresponds to 
the time auction played in the T protocol. Within each panel, the behavior of individuals with 
relatively low CRT scores is depicted on the left and that of those with high CRT scores is shown 
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on the right. The plots reveal that bidding is higher in the monetary auction treatment, especially 
by those with higher CRT scores. In the time auction, there is no clear bidding pattern and there 
seems to be less of a difference in bidding between individuals with high vs. low CRT scores. 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Bidding behavior in the monetary auction vs time auction (T protocol) for CRT types 
(A) CRT=0,1; (B) CRT=2,3 
 
A Mann-Whitney test provides evidence that there is a significant difference in terms of 
bidding levels, between bidders’ behavior in the time auction played within Protocol MT compared 
to Protocol T (Prob > |z| =  0.023, n=119, MWU). On the other hand, if we test for differences in 
deviations from equilibrium, we find that overbidding in time auctions is similar in T and MT, 
both in relative and absolute terms.20 
Our comparison between money and time is summarized in result 3 below: 
 
Result 3: All-pay auctions for both money and time are characterized by greater than 
equilibrium bidding on average and negative bidder payoffs. There is no significant 
difference in the incidence or the extent of overbidding between auctions for money or time.  
Auctions for time are less efficient than those for money. While measures of player 
                                                          
20 Relative to the equilibrium, subjects overbid on average 1.38 in MT compared with 3.25 in  T, not significantly 
different (p=0.243, N1=59, N2=60, t-test). In terms of absolute deviations from the Bayesian Equilibrium the 
difference is also not significant: 5.32 in treatment MT compared with 6.65 in treatment T (p=0.28, N1=59, N2=60, 
t-test).  
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sophistication are positively correlated with bidding closer to equilibrium and greater 
earnings in money auctions, these correlations are not present in auctions for time.     
 
7. Discussion 
Overbidding in all-pay auctions is a pervasive phenomenon that generalizes from money to an 
alternative reward medium, time. The aggregate patterns of behavior are similar in our auctions 
played for money and those played for time. The rent available from winning the auction is more 
than dissipated in both auctions. Thus, the overdisspation of rent is likely to occur not just when 
competition is in terms of expenditures, but when it is in terms of time. Efficiency, whether bidding 
for money or time, is low compared to the levels typically observed in winner-pay auctions, and 
this suggests that it may not be a good idea for economists interested in achieving high levels of 
efficiency to recommend competing for a prize. This is because of the heterogeneity in behavior 
of individuals when they are engaging in a competition. In our auctions, some individuals, our zero 
bidders, choose not to compete. Others, our diagonal bidders, compete too aggressively. The result 
is that in many cases individuals with lower valuations, with a tendency to bid aggressively, will 
sometimes win the auction at the expense of a low-bidding player with a higher valuation. 
The overall similarity in terms of overbidding behavior between the auctions for money 
and time conceals a number of important differences at the level of individual behavior. A gender 
effect in behavior exists in the time auction though not in the money auctions, with women bidding 
significantly higher than men in the time auction. Cognitive sophistication and accurate calibration 
of probabilities is strongly related to bidding behavior and performance in the money auctions, but 
these relationships do not appear in the time auction. This pattern may be due to a correlation 
between cognitive sophistication and the relative weight placed on money relative to time. More 
sophisticated individuals may apply their attention more to the setting in which better decisions 
translate into more money rather than more time.  
Typically, results from the student subjects that participate in laboratory experiments 
generalize well to other populations. However, students may have a relatively low cost of time 
compared to the value of money so that the stakes may differ between the time and money auctions. 
This tradeoff might be different for other populations, such as busy professionals with high 
incomes, for whom time is very scarce relative to money. Thus, future research could productively 
consider whether behavior in time auctions is similar for different demographic groups.  
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Previous work, beginning with Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) would have led us to believe 
that men would bid more than women because of their higher level of competitiveness. In our time 
auctions, we observe the opposite; that men bid lower than women. Although the all pay auction 
is thought of as a model of competition in economic theory, it may not be viewed as such by our 
participants.  
In the all-pay monetary auction, there is a strong relationship between measures of 
sophistication, the CRT and probability calibration scores, and bidding behavior. Individuals with 
higher CRT scores and better calibration are less subject to overbidding and earn more. In future 
research, it would be interesting to group sophisticated people together, make it common 
knowledge that all bidders are sophisticated, and to study how closely behavior conforms to the 
Bayesian equilibrium. Such an approach has been taken by Bosch-Rosa et al. (2017) for markets 
for long lived assets, and they observe that prices conform much more closely to fundamental 
values when agents are more sophisticated. The relationships between sophistication and behavior 
disappear in the time auction. Bidding behavior in the time auction may have correlates that we 
have not measured in this study. This possibility can be explored in future work. 
Another area for follow up work would consider whether the results are similar in terms of real 
effort. Competing in contests may involve money and time, but may also involve costly effort. A 
future research project could consider whether a contest in which a real effort task is conducted 
with the winner receiving a prize behaves similarly to the auctions that we have studied here. 
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ONLINE APPENDIX 
Appendix A, Bayesian equilibrium for the all-pay auctions 
This appendix contains a more detailed derivation of a risk neutral Bayesian equilibrium of the 
monetary all-pay auction. The derivation reproduces the argument presented by Noussair and 
Silver (2006). 
Suppose that all bidders draw a valuation vi from a common distribution F(v), In an all-pay 
auction, they follow a common equilibrium bidding strategy, βi (vi) = β(v), for all i. We assume 
that the strategy is symmetric and strictly monotonic and therefore invertible. Let β -1(b) be the 
inverse of β(v). The probability that bidder i, with a bid of bi, wins the auction, is equal to the 
probability that none of the n-1 participants make higher bids. Therefore, bidder i’s expected 
payoff can be written as is:  
𝛱𝑖(bi , 𝑣i) = 𝑣𝑖* F 
n-1 (β -1(bi)) - 𝑏𝑖          (A1) 
 As 𝑣𝑖 is distributed uniformly in the experiment on [0, ?̅?], for the experimental environment we 
have that   
          F(β -1(b))= β -1(b) /  ?̅? ,       (A2) 
The expected payoff then becomes: 
     𝛱𝑖(bi, 𝑣i) = 𝑣𝑖   ∗   (
𝛽−1(𝑏𝑖)
?̅?
)𝑛−1  - 𝑏𝑖      (A3) 
We solve the corresponding maximization problem:  
𝜕𝛱𝑖(𝑏,𝑣) 
𝜕𝑏𝑖
 = 0    (n-1) * 
𝑣𝑖 
?̅?
*  (
𝛽−1(𝑏𝑖)
?̅?
)𝑛−2* 
𝑑𝛽−1(𝑏𝑖) 
𝑑𝑏𝑖
 – 1= 0      (A4) 
Since β (vi) = 𝑏𝑖  , we have that β 
-1(bi) = 𝑣𝑖,  and  
𝑑𝛽−1(𝑏𝑖) 
𝑑𝑏𝑖
= 
1
𝛽′ (𝑣𝑖)
  .Therefore, 
𝛽′ (𝑣𝑖) = (𝑛 − 1)* (
𝑣𝑖
?̅?
)𝑛−1          (A5) 
In order to solve for the Bayesian equilibrium, we integrate the expression in (A5). 
𝛽(𝑣𝑖) = ∫  𝛽𝑖
′(𝑣𝑖) 𝑑𝑣𝑖 =  
𝑣𝑖
0
∫  (𝑛 − 1) ∗  (
𝑣𝑖
?̅?
)𝑛−1 𝑑𝑣𝑖 =  (
1
?̅?
)𝑛−1  ∗  
𝑛−1
𝑛
𝑣𝑖
0
∗ 𝑣𝑖
𝑛 + C               (A6) 
Since it can be assumed that β (0) = 0, we set C = 0.  It follows that the equilibrium bidding function 
must satisfy: 
𝛽(𝑣𝑖) = (
1
?̅?
)𝑛−1  ∗  
𝑛−1
𝑛
∗ 𝑣𝑖
𝑛                                   (A7) 
The expected payoff of bidder i is then:  
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𝛱𝑖(bi, 𝑣i,) = 𝑣𝑖   ∗   (
𝛽−1(𝑏𝑖)
?̅?
)
𝑛−1
  - 𝑏𝑖   
 𝛱𝑖(𝑣i) = 𝑣𝑖   ∗   (
𝑣𝑖
?̅?
)𝑛−1  - 𝛽(𝑣𝑖)  𝛱(𝑣i)i = 𝑣𝑖   ∗   (
𝑣𝑖
?̅?
)𝑛−1   -  (
1
?̅?
)𝑛−1  ∗  
𝑛−1
𝑛
∗ 𝑣𝑖
𝑛   
𝛱𝑖(𝑣i) =(
1
?̅?
)𝑛−1 ∗ 𝑣𝑖
𝑛 ∗  
1
𝑛
         (A8) 
 
 
Appendix B: Instructions 
Instructions Protocol MT: 
ID:_______ 
Welcome everybody!  
You are about to participate in an experiment in the economics of decision-making. For 
participating in this experiment, you will receive a show up fee of 10€. Any extra earnings gained 
during the experiment will be added to this sum. The total earnings will be paid by bank transfer 
within the next 48h. The experiment will consist of three parts. In the first part you will be required 
to answer a few questions. The second part will consist of series of auctions in which you will be 
bidding for a unit of good called “Y”. In part 3 you will play a game that will determine the time 
when you can leave the experiment.  
After each stage, we will distribute the instructions for the following stage. Also, any form of 
communication with other participants is prohibited. Any questions should be directed towards the 
instructors. Any deviation of this rule will result in direct exclusion from the experiment and loss 
of any return. Please write on every page received your ANR in the left top corner of your 
documents. 
 
 
Stage 1: 
Please answer the following questions as good as you can. 
 Each question you answer correctly in this stage will increase your total earnings by 1 € .   
QUESTION NR. 1: 
 36 
 
A shirt and a hat cost 5.50 € in total. The shirt costs 5 € more than the hat. How much does the hat 
costs? ______ cents     
QUESTION NR. 2: 
If it takes 3 people 3 hours to assemble 3 bicycles, how long would it take 90 people to assemble 
90 bicycles?  _______ hours   
QUESTION NR. 3: 
The forest of North Carolina is home to a colony of wild rabbits. Every year, the colony doubles 
in size. If it takes 24 years for the colony to reach 100.000 rabbits, how long would it take for the 
colony to reach half of that number? ______ years 
ID:_______ 
Stage 2: 
In the current stage you will take part in multiple auctions. There will be held 15 auctions 
and 1 practice period.  Each period you will be grouped with other 4 participants. Identifying the 
participants in your group is not possible. The currency used within the experiment is called 
“ECU”. The conversion rate is 100 ECU to 1 euro. In the beginning you will receive an initial 
endowment of 1000 ECU. 
In each period, a single unit, called “Y”, will be auctioned separately to each group. A 
Record sheet will be provided. On the Record Sheet, under the column “Product value”, a value is 
written for each period. This value represents your product valuation and is an indication of the 
amount of ECU you can obtain if you win unit “Y”. The "Product Value" is chosen randomly 
before the experiment and independently from other player’s valuation and will be an integer 
between 1 and 1000. Every period you can submit a positive bid by filling in the amount in column 
“Bid”. You will pay the bid whether you win or not. All participants will submit their bids 
simultaneously without having any information about the bids of other subjects. The bidder with 
the highest bid, within each group, will receive unit “Y”. In case of a tie, the unit will be randomly 
assigned by a coin toss.  
 
Calculating your earning: 
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In case that you have the highest bid within the auction, you have to write under the column 
"ECU won" your "Product Value" for that period; otherwise a 0 should be filled in. After every 
auction, you have to record your earnings, which you can easily calculate by subtracting Column 
3 from Column 4, in the column named "Earnings per period". 
At the end of the experiment, your total return will be the sum of all your period earnings 
plus the initial endowment of 1000 ECU. 
Example : Suppose that your Product value is 300 and you write a bid of 250 in the column "Bid".  
If you win the auction by having the highest bid among all bids, you will write 300 under "ECU 
won". Therefore, your earnings for that period will be equal to 300 - 250 =50. If you happen not 
to win the auction, you will write 0 under "ECU won" and - 250 under "Earnings per period". 
ID:_______ 
Reporting probabilities 
Before we start the auctions, you will be given a series of questions in which you will be 
asked to report the probability with which you believe a person can win the auction, by bidding a 
certain amount of ECUs. You should report a probability from 0% to 100%. Your earnings will 
be determined by the accuracy of your predictions. The reported probability will be compared with 
the probability of winning the auction in a previous session by placing the specified bid in the 
question. The reported probabilities for each bid will not influence any of your potential payoffs 
in the later stages of the experiment. Your potential earnings will be calculated using the following 
formula: 
Payoff = max{0, 10- 45(Pt --Pa )2 }   
Basically, what the formula does is that it penalizes you every time your reported probability is 
different than the actual probability. You can obtain the most revenue when the actual probability 
is equal to the reported probability. The most you can get is 10 €. Let’s look at an example: 
Example: Suppose an individual plays the auction presented above against 4 other people. All 
players' values are equally likely to be any value between 1 and 1000. What are the chances that 
the individual wins the auction if he bids 20? If you believe that the probability of winning the 
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auction is 38% but the actual probability is 20%, you can receive: Payoff = max{0, 10 - 45(0.38—
0.20)2 } = 8.54 € 
 
At the end of the experiment, one of the periods will be chosen at random to be paid. Depending 
on how accurate your prediction is for that period, you will receive the amount of Euros 
corresponding to the formula presented. Therefore, you should respond as accurate as you can in 
each period, as any of your choices could prove to be the one that determines the payment.   
Question 1: Suppose an individual plays the auction presented above against 4 other people. All 
players' values are equally likely to be any value between 1 and 1000. What are the chances that 
the individual wins the auction if he bids 50?   _____% 
Question 2: Suppose an individual plays the auction presented above against 4 other people. All 
players' values are equally likely to be any value between 1 and 1000. What are the chances that 
the individual wins the auction if he bids 100?   _____% 
Question 3: Suppose an individual plays the auction presented above against 4 other people. All 
players' values are equally likely to be any value between 1 and 1000. What are the chances that 
the individual wins the auction if he bids 150?   _____% 
Question 4: Suppose an individual plays the auction presented above against 4 other people. All 
players' values are equally likely to be any value between 1 and 1000. What are the chances that 
the individual wins the auction if he bids 200?   _____% 
Question 5: Suppose an individual plays the auction presented above against 4 other people. All 
players' values are equally likely to be any value between 1 and 1000. What are the chances that 
the individual wins the auction if he bids 250?   _____% 
Question 6: Suppose an individual plays the auction presented above against 4 other people. All 
players' values are equally likely to be any value between 1 and 1000. What are the chances that 
the individual wins the auction if he bids 300?   _____% 
Question 7: Suppose an individual plays the auction presented above against 4 other people. All 
players' values are equally likely to be any value between 1 and 1000. What are the chances that 
the individual wins the auction if he bids 350?   _____% 
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Question 8: Suppose an individual plays the auction presented above against 4 other people. All 
players' values are equally likely to be any value between 1 and 1000. What are the chances that 
the individual wins the auction if he bids 400?   _____% 
Question 9: Suppose an individual plays the auction presented above against 4 other people. All 
players' values are equally likely to be any value between 1 and 1000. What are the chances that 
the individual wins the auction if he bids 450?   _____% 
Question 10: Suppose an individual plays the auction presented above against 4 other people. 
All players' values are equally likely to be any value between 1 and 1000. What are the chances 
that the individual wins the auction if he bids 500?   _____% 
Question 11: Suppose an individual plays the auction presented above against 4 other people. 
All players' values are equally likely to be any value between 1 and 1000. What are the chances 
that the individual wins the auction if he bids 550?   _____% 
Question 12: Suppose an individual plays the auction presented above against 4 other people. 
All players' values are equally likely to be any value between 1 and 1000. What are the chances 
that the individual wins the auction if he bids 600?   _____% 
Question 13: Suppose an individual plays the auction presented above against 4 other people. 
All players' values are equally likely to be any value between 1 and 1000. What are the chances 
that the individual wins the auction if he bids 650?   _____% 
Question 14: Suppose an individual plays the auction presented above against 4 other people. 
All players' values are equally likely to be any value between 1 and 1000. What are the chances 
that the individual wins the auction if he bids 700?   _____% 
Question 15: Suppose an individual plays the auction presented above against 4 other people. 
All players' values are equally likely to be any value between 1 and 1000. What are the chances 
that the individual wins the auction if he bids 750?   _____% 
Question 16: Suppose an individual plays the auction presented above against 4 other people. 
All players' values are equally likely to be any value between 1 and 1000. What are the chances 
that the individual wins the auction if he bids 800?   _____% 
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Question 17: Suppose an individual plays the auction presented above against 4 other people. 
All players' values are equally likely to be any value between 1 and 1000. What are the chances 
that the individual wins the auction if he bids 850?   _____% 
Question 18: Suppose an individual plays the auction presented above against 4 other people. 
All players' values are equally likely to be any value between 1 and 1000. What are the chances 
that the individual wins the auction if he bids 900?   _____% 
Question 19: Suppose an individual plays the auction presented above against 4 other people. 
All players' values are equally likely to be any value between 1 and 1000. What are the chances 
that the individual wins the auction if he bids 950?   _____% 
ID :_______ 
 
Now that you have assessed the probabilities we can start the auctions. Firstly, we will have one 
period for practice purpose. Please take Record Sheet Nr. 1 and fill in you bid in the practice 
period. Your Endowment is 1000 ECU. You are not allowed to fill in your bids before each stage 
ends. 
 
 
Record sheet Nr. 1       
Period Product Value Bid ECU won Earnings per period 
Practice 425    
1 422    
2 273    
3 181    
4 36    
5 276    
6 855    
7 651    
8 860    
9 676    
10 197    
11 331    
12 158    
13 110    
14 658    
15 998    
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                             Total earnings per 
period=______________ECU                                                                                                                    
 
Total Earnings=1000 + _________= _________ECU  
ID:_______ 
Stage 3 
In this stage, everybody must wait 30 minutes in the laboratory. For taking part in stage 3 
you receive an additional one-time payment of 6 €. This extra payment is independent of your 
show-up fee of 10€. During the mandatory waiting time, you are not allowed to do anything. You 
cannot use the computer or any other device, you cannot read and you cannot communicate with 
other participants. However, you can have the chance to decrease the mandatory time and leave 
the laboratory earlier by participating in an auction similar to the one in stage 2. A paper called 
"Record Sheet Nr. 2" will be provided. The instructions of the auction are similar to the one in 
stage 2, with some exceptions. There will be no endowment given at the beginning of the auction. 
Each participant receives an unique “Time exemption” which is chosen randomly and 
independently before the experiment and is any integer between 1 and 30 . This value is recorded 
under the column "Time exemption". The currency used within the auction is time. Therefore, all 
the biddings and payoffs will be made using minutes. As before, you will be grouped randomly 
with other 4 participants. Every bid submitted and written under column “Bid" will be paid.  
If you are successful in winning the auction (have the highest bid among the 5 players), the number 
of minutes that you win after you pay your bid, will be subtracted from the mandatory waiting 
time and you can leave the laboratory earlier. If you are unfortunate and loose the auction, your 
waiting time will not be decreased. However, you will have to pay your bid by staying on top of 
the mandatory time, the number of minutes you bided.  Please read carefully the following 
examples. Afterwards, a practice period will be held. 
 
Example 1: Let’s suppose that you’re “Time exemption” is 12 minutes. If you bid 14 minutes and 
your bid is the highest among all the other bidders, then after paying the bid (12-14= -2) you will 
actually have to wait in the laboratory an additional 2 minutes after stage 3 is over. 
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Example 2: Suppose that you’re “Time exemption” is 20 minutes and you bid an amount of 11 
minutes and you win the auction. Then, you will be able to decrease your mandatory waiting time 
by 9 minutes. (20-11= 9). In other words, you will be able to leave the experiment 9 minutes earlier 
than when the experiment is supposed to finish. 
 
Example 3: Suppose that you have a “Time exemption” equal to 12 and you bid 6 minutes. 
However, you are not successful in winning the auction. Therefore, you will have to wait in the 
laboratory an additional 6 minutes after stage 3 is over. 
 
Record sheet Nr. 2 
ID participant: _______ 
You are not allowed to fill in your bids before each stage ends. 
 
Practice period: Time exemption =  
   Bid _____ 
   Total waiting time _________ 
 
Period 1:     Time exemption = 
   Bid _____ 
   Total waiting time _________ 
 
After finishing the auction please fill in some questions regarding your background. The 
answers will remain confidential as you will provide only your ID.   
After this, the experimenter will announce when the mandatory 30 minutes period starts. Then, 
you have to wait patiently in your chair, until the total amount of waiting time which you have to 
remain in laboratory (adjusted by the  minutes won or lost in the auction) , elapses. 
 
Thank you for your cooperation! 
 
Instructions Protocol T: 
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ID:_______ 
Welcome everybody!  
You are about to participate in an experiment in the economics of decision-making. For 
participating in all 2 stages experiment, you will receive a fixed endowment of 5€. Any extra 
earnings gained during the experiment will be added to this sum. The total earnings will be paid 
by bank transfer within the next 24h. The experiment will consist of two parts. In the first part you 
will be required to answer a few questions. Each question responded correctly will bring you 1 €. 
The second part will consist of an auction and a game. 
Written in the left top corner of your instruction sheet, you will find an unique ID . Please turn the 
page in order to begin stage 1.  
Stage 1: 
Please answer the following questions as good as you can.  
Each question you answer correctly will increase your total earnings by 1 € .   
QUESTION NR. 1: 
A shirt and a hat cost 5.50 € in total. The shirt costs 5 € more than the hat. How much does the hat 
costs? ______ cents     
QUESTION NR. 2: 
If it takes 3 people 3 hours to assembly 3 bicycles, how long would it take 90 people to assembly 
90 bicycles?  _______ hours   
QUESTION NR. 3: 
The forest of North Carolina is home to a colony of wild rabbits. Every year, the colony doubles 
in size. If it takes 24 years for the colony to reach 100.000 rabbits, how long would it take for the 
colony to reach half of that number? ______ years 
Stage 2 
 
In this stage, everybody must wait 30 minutes in the laboratory. During the mandatory 
waiting time, you are not allowed to do anything. You cannot use the computer or any other device, 
you cannot read and you cannot communicate with other participants. However, you can have the 
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chance to decrease the mandatory time and leave the laboratory earlier by participating in an 
auction. 
The “Time Redemption” chosen randomly and independently before the experiment, is 
likely any  integer between 1 and 30 and is recorded under the column " Time Redemption". The 
currency used within the auction is time. Therefore, all the biddings and payoffs will be made 
using minutes. 
You will be grouped randomly with other 4 participants. Identifying the participants in 
your group is not possible. Please record your bid and results in stage 2, on the Record Sheet Nr. 
1 provided in the beginning of the experiment. Every period you can submit a positive bid by 
filling in the amount in column “Bid”. You will pay the bid whether you win or not. The bidder 
with the highest bid, within each group, will win the auction. In case of a tie, the unit will be 
randomly assigned by a coin toss. 
If you are successful in winning the auction, the number of minutes that you win after you pay 
your bid, will be subtracted from the mandatory waiting time and you can leave the laboratory 
earlier. If you are unfortunate and loose the auction, your waiting time will not be decreased. 
However, you will have to pay your bid by staying on top of the mandatory time, the number of 
minutes you bided.  
Firstly, a practice period will be held. 
 
Example 1: Let’s suppose that you’re “Time exemption” is 12 minutes. If you bid 14 minutes and 
your bid is the highest among all the other bidders, then after paying the bid (12-14= -2) you will 
actually have to wait in the laboratory an additional 2 minutes after stage 3 is over. 
 
Example 2: Suppose that you’re “Time exemption” is 20 minutes and you bid an amount of 11 
minutes and you win the auction. Then, you will be able to decrease your mandatory waiting time 
by 9 minutes. (20-11= 9). In other words, you will be able to leave the experiment 9 minutes earlier 
than when the experiment is supposed to finish. 
 
Example 3: Suppose that you have a “Time exemption” equal to 12 and you bid 6 minutes. 
However, you are not successful in winning the auction. Therefore, you will have to wait in the 
laboratory an additional 6 minutes after stage 3 is over. 
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Reporting Probabilities 
Before we start the auction, you will be given a series of questions in which you will be 
asked to report the probability with which you believe a person can win the auction, by bidding a 
certain amount minutes. You should report a probability from 0% to 100%. Your earnings will be 
determined by how accurate your prediction will be. The reported probability will be compared 
with the average probability of winning the auction in a previous session from a randomly chosen 
group.  The reported probabilities for each bid will not influence any of your potential payoffs in 
the later stages of the experiment. Your potential earnings will be calculated using the following 
formula: Payoff = max{0, 10- 45(Pt --Pa )2 }   
Basically, what the formula does is that it penalizes you every time your reported probability is 
different than the actual probability. You can obtain the most revenue when the actual probability is equal 
to the reported probability. The most you can get is 10 €. Let’s look at an example: 
Example: Suppose an individual plays the auction presented above against 4 other people. All 
players' values are equally likely to be any value between 1 and 30. What are the chances that the 
individual wins the auction if he bids 5? If you believe that the probability of winning the auction 
is 38%  but the actual probability is 20%, you can receive = Payoff = max{0, 10 - 45(0.38—0.20)2 
} = 8.54 € 
 
At the end of the experiment, one of the periods will be chosen at random to be paid. 
Depending on how accurate your prediction is for that period, you will receive the amount of 
ECU corresponding to the Decision Table presented. Therefore, you should respond as accurate 
as you can in each period, as any of your choices could prove to be the one that determines the 
payment. 
 
Question 1: Suppose an individual plays the auction presented above against 4 other people. All 
players' values are equally likely to be any value between 1 and 30. What are the chances that the 
individual wins the auction if he bids 2?  ______%  
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Question 2: Suppose an individual plays the auction presented above against 4 other people. All 
players' values are equally likely to be any value between 1 and 30. What are the chances that the 
individual wins the auction if he bids 4?  ______%  
 
Question 3: Suppose an individual plays the auction presented above against 4 other people. All 
players' values are equally likely to be any value between 1 and 30. What are the chances that the 
individual wins the auction if he bids 6?  ______%  
 
Question 4: Suppose an individual plays the auction presented above against 4 other people. All 
players' values are equally likely to be any value between 1 and 30. What are the chances that the 
individual wins the auction if he bids 8?  ______%  
 
Question 5: Suppose an individual plays the auction presented above against 4 other people. All 
players' values are equally likely to be any value between 1 and 30. What are the chances that the 
individual wins the auction if he bids 10?  ______%  
 
Question 6: Suppose an individual plays the auction presented above against 4 other people. All 
players' values are equally likely to be any value between 1 and 30. What are the chances that the 
individual wins the auction if he bids 12?  ______%  
 
Question 7: Suppose an individual plays the auction presented above against 4 other people. All 
players' values are equally likely to be any value between 1 and 30. What are the chances that the 
individual wins the auction if he bids 14?  ______%  
 
Question 8: Suppose an individual plays the auction presented above against 4 other people. All 
players' values are equally likely to be any value between 1 and 30. What are the chances that the 
individual wins the auction if he bids 16?  ______%  
 
Question 9: Suppose an individual plays the auction presented above against 4 other people. All 
players' values are equally likely to be any value between 1 and 30. What are the chances that the 
individual wins the auction if he bids 18?  ______%  
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Question 10: Suppose an individual plays the auction presented above against 4 other people. All 
players' values are equally likely to be any value between 1 and 30. What are the chances that the 
individual wins the auction if he bids 20?  ______%  
 
Question 11: Suppose an individual plays the auction presented above against 4 other people. All 
players' values are equally likely to be any value between 1 and 30. What are the chances that the 
individual wins the auction if he bids 22?  ______%  
 
Question 12: Suppose an individual plays the auction presented above against 4 other people. All 
players' values are equally likely to be any value between 1 and 30. What are the chances that the 
individual wins the auction if he bids 24?  ______%  
 
Question 13: Suppose an individual plays the auction presented above against 4 other people. All 
players' values are equally likely to be any value between 1 and 30. What are the chances that the 
individual wins the auction if he bids 26?  ______%  
 
Question 14: Suppose an individual plays the auction presented above against 4 other people. All 
players' values are equally likely to be any value between 1 and 30. What are the chances that the 
individual wins the auction if he bids 28?  ______%  
 
Auction: 
 
Now that you have assessed the probabilities we can start the auctions. Firstly, we will have one 
period for practice purpose. Please take Record Sheet Nr. 1 and fill in the values in the practice 
period. 
 
Record sheet Nr. 1 
ID participant: _______ 
Practice period: Time exemption =  
   Bid _____ 
   Total waiting time _________ 
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Period 1:     Time exemption = 
   Bid _____ 
   Total waiting time _________ 
After finishing the auction please fill in the appropriate numbers in Record sheet Nr. 2 and 
answer a few questions regarding your background. The answers will remain confidential as you 
will provide only your ID.   
After this, the experimenter will announce when the mandatory 30 minutes period starts. Then, 
you have to wait patiently in your chair, until the total amount of waiting time which you have to 
remain in laboratory (adjusted by the  minutes won or lost in the auction) , elapses. 
 
 Thank you for your cooperation! 
 
Background Information: 
 
ID number: ________ 
 
As your ID number is not known either by the instructor or by others participants, this information 
will remain anonymously. Please fill in the questionnaire or select the appropriate category. 
 
1. What is your age? ____ years 
2. What is your gender?  
(Female / Male) 
3. What is your race? 
  (White, Black, Yellow, Red, Brown) 
4. What is your religion?  
(Christian / Atheist / Muslim / Buddhist / Others) 
5. How many years of higher education you have? ___ years 
6. How many siblings do you have? _____ 
7. What is your family income per year approximately? _______ Euros 
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(10.000- 15.000); (15.000 -30.000); (30.000-60.000); (60.000-100.000); higher 
8. How many years of higher education do your parents have? _____years 
9. Have you ever encountered the first 3 questions asked in Stage 1 of the experiment?  Yes 
/No 
 
APPENDIX C: Additional Figures and Tables 
Figure C1: The average difference between the bidding strategies and RNBE, by CRT 
CRT <2 Low ability, differences over the last 5 periods 
  
CRT >2 High ability, differences (A) over the last 5 periods (B) over all 15 periods 
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Table C1. OLS Results – Time auction (treatment MT) 
(a) Absolute deviation from the RNBE 
 (1) (3) (4) 
 Abs. Average Bid-
RNBE 
Abs. Average Bid-
RNBE 
Abs. Average 
Bid-RNBE 
CRT -1.33  -1.15 
 (-1.93)*  (-1.55) 
Male  -2.13 -1.54 
  (-1.37) (-0.94) 
Constant 7.87 6.44   8.36 
 (5.31)*** (6.50)*** (5.71)*** 
Observations 59 58 58 
Goodness of fit:            
R-squared 
5.8% 3.3% 7.4% 
Note: dependent variable: Absolute deviation of bid from the risk neutral Bayesian equilibrium in time auction 
OLS regression, t-value based on robust s.e. in parenthesis; */**/*** stands for statistical significance at 10%, 
5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
(b) Average earnings 
 (1) (3) (4) 
 Average 
Earnings 
Average 
Earnings 
Average 
Earnings 
CRT 0.43  0.27 
 (0.54)  (0.35) 
Male  1.58 1.44 
  (1.21) (1.23) 
Constant -1.88 -1.83 -2.28 
 (-0.98) (-1.92)* (-1.13) 
Observations 59 58 58 
Goodness of fit:            
R-squared 
0% 2.5% 2.8% 
Note: dependent variable: Average earnings in time auction. OLS regression, coefficient reported, t-value based 
on robust s.e. in parenthesis; */**/*** stands for statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
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(c)  Deviations of bid from the RNBE 
 (1) (3) (4) 
 Average Bid-
RNBE 
Average Bid-RNBE Average Bid-
RNBE 
CRT -2.44    -1.84 
 (  -2.42)**  (-1.80)* 
Male  -6.33 -5.39 
  (-3.28)*** (-2.52)** 
Constant 6.05 4.468  7.52 
 (2.68)*** (3.40)*** (4.21)** 
Observations 59 58 58 
Goodness of fit:            
R-squared 
11% 16% 22% 
Note: dependent variable: Difference between an individual’s bid and  the risk neutral Bayesian equilibrium 
bid OLS regression, t-value based on robust s.e. in parentheses; */**/*** stands for statistical significance at 
10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
 
